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In a country that thrives on commercialism and image, the motion picture industry 
is an engine of social commentary, celebrity, and enormous cash flows. From the 
development of the first kinetoscope to our current star-studded event-movie culture, 
the industry has evolved and grown to become one of the largest and most influential 
cultural forces in the world today. 
Substantial critical analysis and literature exist discussing aesthetic qualities in 
film production. This paper does not follow that particular line of inquiry. Instead, 
we examine film as an industry focused on profitability, in which all decisions are 
based on the ultimate bottom-line. More specifically, the purpose of this paper is to 
relate temporal cost decisions and profitability by reconciling the contrasting qualities 
of high upfront costs with a high degree of uncertainty of reward at the outset of a 
film project. Since the genesis of the industry, the structure of film financing and the 
nature of revenue accrual have undergone profound change, wrought both by external 
forces and competition from within. In this paper we try to provide an overview of 
how the industry actually operates, and an understanding of the seemingly irrational 
ways in which decisions are often made. 
This paper is organized as follows. It will first explain the political, legal, and 
economic forces that led to a shift in contract and cost structure in the feature 
film industry. It will then present an economic model explaining how, based on 
economic intuition, we should expect costs of feature film production to be structured 
once equilibrium is attained. Next, it will give an overview of the current body of 
academic literature on forecasting box office receipts, revenues, and other measures 
of profitability in the film industry. It will then present an econometric model that 
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attempts to provide empirical evidence for the conclusions of the earlier economic 
model. Next will be a discussion of the data compiled, econometric analysis of said 
data, and an interpretation of the results. Finally, possible extensions and further 
research will be presented, followed by a conclusion. 
2 History and Evolution of the Industry 
2.1 Edison and Early Film 
Today's major studios can each be traced to their common geneses in the arcades and 
parlors of the turn of the century, where Thomas A. Edison's innovation of pictures 
simulating movement offered a fantastic distraction to an evermore entertainment-
seeking public. The movie's humble beginnings were around 1889, when Edison 
fine-tuned the kinetoscope, a novelty box in which 50 feet of picture film was moved 
with such rapidity that it appeared to simulate motion to the single person viewing 
the spectacle through a magnifying lens. Demand for the kinetoscope grew quickly, 
and it could soon be seen en masse in the penny arcades of America's large cities. The 
Edison lab continued to innovate, next producing in 1896 the vitascope, which took 
the technology of the kinetoscope and projected it life-size onto a screen, allowing 
for the possibility of multiple persons viewing the same film simultaneously.! Movies 
of this era were short, silent films produced by a variety of independent producers. 
Initially, the homogenous products were shown in nickelodeons, where for only a 
nickel one could escape reality for a few short moments. Exhibitors realized quickly 
that establishing exhibition halls would allow profits to roll in while keeping rental 
costs of the films the same, and the Edison Trust's patented projectors offered just 
such an opportunity. 
Many of these early entrepreneurs were self-educated, first-generation Jewish im-
migrants seeking to make a new life for themselves free from the perils of Eastern 
Europe. Seeing further profit opportunity, several of these ambitious immigrants 
strived for competitive advantage over other exhibitors. They sought to achieve 
economies of scale by buying more halls for exhibition. Louis Mayer, one of the 
future founders of MGM, expanded to a circuit of theaters in the northeastern US, 
allowing him to physically transport film reels by bicycle from one location to an-
other and choose showtimes with profit-maximizing precision.2 Others followed suit, 
lSee Zierer (1947) for more indepth history of the early technological innovations that prompted 
industry evolution, as well as very interesting urban geographical explanations for the industry's 
move to Hollywood. 
2See Epstein (2005) for a good description of these early innovators in the film industry. 
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further streamlining the exhibition process. 
The immigrants continued to consolidate the exhibition arm of the new film 
industry. Early on, the major exhibitors began to realize that films were not getting 
made quickly enough to keep their theaters filled. Vertical integration into production 
seemed like the most efficient next step; with low production costs and control over 
screens, the exhibitors could effectively manage both content and content-delivery, 
allowing them to exact further rents from the public. 
At this time, the growing power of exhibitors was hindered only by pressure 
from the Edison Trust. With patents on both the projector and the camera, as 
well as a contract binding the principal manufacturer of raw film, the Eastman 
Kodak Company, to only sell to Edison-licensed companies, the Trust had a very 
firm stranglehold on the film industry. When independent producers attempted to 
buy raw stock from other suppliers to produce films, Edison's Trust applied pressure 
of litigation to force them to pay exorbitant licensing fees . Many have argued that 
the root of conflict between the Trust and the immigrants was both economic and 
social in nature (see Epstein 2005). Regardless of source, it is clear that conflict 
existed that restricted the short-term growth of independents. At first, the ad-hoc 
producers used complex deception to avoid litigation, filming movies with Edison 
cameras disguised by fa~ades of non-patented technology. As pressure grew, though, 
the major exhibitors decided that the time had come to put physical distance between 
themselves and Edison. 
They set their sights on the newly incorporated west-coast city of Hollywood. 
Early filming took place outdoors to make use of better light to supplement the low 
quality of early filmmaking tools. Los Angeles' 
beautiful weather and landscapes offered unprecedented opportunity to shoot year-
round. The advent of sound in the motion picture industry, first adopted by Warner 
Brothers in 1928 for their The Jazz Singer and followed closely by RKO and the 
other major studios of the time, led to investment in physical sound facilities, further 
anchoring the major players of the industry to Hollywood. With an entire country 
between them and the lawyers of the Edison Trust, they promptly established what 
soon became the golden era of the studio system. 
2.2 The Rise of the Studio System 
Few could have foreseen what the film industry's meager beginnings would yield 
in less than a century. The public began to frequent the new movie theaters on 
a weekly basis; upwards of 7,000,000 eager moviegoers crowded into US theaters 
daily for the entertainment that had quickly swept the nation, indicating "an appeal 
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to at least half the nation.,,3 Over the next 30 years, the men who were once poor 
immigrants became the new elite, the moguls of the new studio system. They exerted 
tremendous power by transforming the film industry into what came to be described 
as an industrial machine. The studio system looked predominately to only one place 
for revenue: the American box office. Through control of every component of the 
value chain, the studio system was able to efficiently ensure that product of constant 
quality filled their screens (and thus the seats in their theaters) regularly. 
2.2.1 Exhibition 
By the 1920's, virtually all first-run movie theaters and the majority of second-
run movie theaters were owned by the studios. In the simplest sense, this vertical 
integration ensured a constant outlet for a studio's own films. Additionally, it allowed 
for a great deal of price discrimination. The typical exhibition scheme began with a 
film showing in a studio's own first-run cinemas in major city centers, where studios 
could charge a considerable premium and still ensure capacity their theaters. As 
admission in certain first-run theaters began to dwindle, the studios would transfer 
negatives from theaters with declining revenue/screen to first-run theaters in other 
cities. The next step in the process would be for the films to be shown in second-
and third-run, mostly independent, theaters in the less centralized towns for cheaper 
prices. Revenues from company-owned box office were entirely internalized, and the 
share of revenue yielded to independent theaters was small (around 30-40%). Costs 
of production were still quite low, so profitability in this arena was exceptional. 
At the same time, a tit-for-tat situation of unofficial industry cooperation emerged. 
Because the vast majority of first-run theaters were owned by one of the six major 
studios, each studio was often seller to another studio in one city and buyer from that 
studio in · a different city. Harsh negotiations in one city would thus lead to equally 
tough terms in the other city - instead, preferential treatment for studios became 
the industry standard, creating a powerful entry barrier for independent exhibitors. 
An even more potent barrier to entry, however, was the studios' 
near 100% control of content. The studios possessed immense leverage in that the 
majority of revenues came from their own theaters, so they could afford to not rent 
their films to independents. An independent theater could thus not get the top 
movies with stars that would fill their seats unless they agreed to severely disadvan-
tageous terms dictated by the studios' 
distribution arms. During this era, many independent theaters were forced to spe-
cialize in films with less marketability (art house films, etc), attempting to serve a 
3 Johnston (1926) p. 20 
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vertical integration into efficient means of distribution similarly offered immense 
advantages against independents through economies of scale and leverage in negoti-
ations. One of the more infamous practices of studio-owned distribution arms was 
that of block booking. The primary goal of independent theaters at the time was 
to maximize ticket sales (concessions were growing in importance, but were nowhere 
near the level of significance that they are at today). If a theater predicted that a 
particular studio-produced film was going to have a small demand, screen scarcity 
would lead them to prefer rental of a different film with greater demand. Through 
the process of block booking, however, the studios packaged these B-list movies with 
their top movies in an all-or-nothing deal for either six months' 
or a year's worth of movies. If the theater refused, it would not have enough con-
tent to keep seats filled. If it accepted, it was forced to waste precious screen space 
showing films it knew would be unsuccessful. The studio's negotiating position of 
extreme leverage forced the independent theaters to accept poor terms or no terms. 4 
Yet another tactic utilized by the studio distributors took advantage of asymmet-
ric information. The studios knew the quality of their films, while the independent 
theaters could only know the quality of the films if they were invited to a screening. 
In general, the theaters wanted to see a film before they agreed to rent it. The 
studios, however, had a strong incentive to get their films to exhibition as soon af-
ter production as possible (in order to minimize interest accruing on the immense 
financing required to produce a film). The studios therefore often used their leverage 
to engage in practices of blind-selling, whereby independent theaters were forced to 
agree to show a film even before it was completed. Finally, the studios' 
distribution arms held a major advantage against independent distributors: lower 
costs of physical distribution and marketing created a large barrier to entry. Distri-
bution costs of studio distributors were incredibly low, around $60,000 per picture, 
primarily because films only opened in a few select theaters in a region at a time. Be-
cause of this, films could be shown in New York and then transferred to California for 
considerably less cost than cutting new negatives. Wide openings were not the norm 
as they are today - the goal was highly controlled exhibitions that would extract as 
4For an interesting argument in favor of block booking policies based on economic efficiency, see 
Caves (2002), p.163-165. 
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many rents as possible over time. Costs of advertising were comparably low (around 
$30,000 per picture), primarily because posters and such could be transferred with 
film reels as a film closed in one city and opened in another. 
2.2.3 Production 
While integration into the distribution and exhibition arenas of film offered unprece-
dented control of the product's outlet, this control would be of little use without 
a constant stream of consistent-quality product to exhibit. Around the turn of the 
century, the European film community had begun producing feature-length films. 
The new innovation was a huge success with audiences, and the Hollywood commu-
nity was quick to incorporate it into their process. In so doing, however, the average 
cost of a film skyrocketed in comparison with the shorter films of the previous era. 
For the studios to turn a profit, they had to generally be able to produce their films 
for less money than their net receipts totaled.5 Two main components of the studio 
system enabled the studio to become tremendously efficient producers of movies and 
collectors of the resulting windfalls: total in-house production, and the realization of 
the power of stars. 
The shift to in-house production was a striking one. The studios are typically 
regarded with amusement or scorn, citing excessive spending and elaborate lifestyles 
as the antithesis of efficiency in a business. 'The reality, however, is that the stu-
dio system was one of the most efficient means of production imaginable. Within 
a matter of years, the studios purchased enormous amounts of real-estate in Holly-
wood and set about physically establishing what is currently thought of as studio 
lots: a huge all-encompassing environment for the production of feature films. Each 
stage of the productive process was internalized to streamline costs. In-house writers 
and script doctors were paid in stages for various drafts, treatments, and finished 
scripts.6 To lower the cost of filming on location, enormous backlots were constructed 
enabling entire movies to be filmed in one setting. Make-up houses, soundstages, 
post-production facilities, and nearly every other factor of production was internal-
ized into the studio system to maximize overall profits by keeping production costs 
5This is of course an oversimplification, as rents in exhibition were occasionally ceded to other 
studios, costs of marketing and distribution were significantly different from zero, etc, but the point 
remains that costs had to be streamlined to ensure profit maximization. 
6This screenplay staged-coI].tract developed over time because of a combination of incentive 
problems and legality issues. Initially studios received thousands of external submissions of scripts, 
but writers often filed plagiarism suits against the studio if anything resembling their failed script 
appeared in a project. This led to in-house writers and options on any external projects (see Caves 
2002). 
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to a minimum. 
Arguably, one of the largest transformations of the industry was brought about 
by the discovery of film stars' 
widespread appeal to audiences; the studios' 
manipulation of this realization through subsequent marketing of every facet of a 
star's life was masterful. In the early years of film, films were largely homogenous so 
the marketing of a film was relatively small (often limited only to the movie's name 
on the marquis of the cinemas). Early filmgoers did not have a wide variety of films 
from which to choose - they simply attended their local theater on a weekly basis, 
regardless of what film was actually playing. As film production and theaters prolif-
erated, the audience suddenly had a new dimension of choice in deciding whether to 
'consume' a movie or not. Early exhibitors competed on price, as economic theory 
predicts for a market of homogenous goods. Slowly, however, it was realized that the 
public had a fascination with the star actors of movies. With this realization, the 
studios finally had an opportunity to brand certain movies through inclusion of a 
star, differentiating them from the competition by sending a certain signal of quality 
to public that the film must be better because it has a star in it.7 
Additionally, the studios realized the immediate benefit of cultivating a particular 
image of the star both onscreen (through the type of characters the star played) and 
offscreen (through media outlets, press, etc). Having a particular star in a movie 
conveyed something to the public about the level of quality of the film and what 
could be expected of the fil~. Marketing was becoming more focused on particular 
demographics, so this was a significant way of directing marketing efforts. Developing 
a star became a refined art, but to cement an image in the public's mind required an 
immense amount of control over everything the public heard about a star. To ensure 
this, the studios developed a talent contract considered to be mutually beneficial to 
both actor and studio. Much like the pop music contracts of today, the unknown 
actor signed an exclusivity contract with the studio for 7 years with the option to 
renew and/or renegotiate at an escalating salary every 6-12 months thereafter. Under 
the conditions of the contract, the studio controlled every aspect of the actor's life 
for those next 7+ years. The studio chose what roles the actor would play, crafted 
every press release and interview that the actor participated in, had full use of his 
7 Oddly, studio names never were a source of true brand equity, even in the early days of film, 
with the only possible exceptions being Disney and Pixar. This could stem from the wide variability 
of studio projects, and the want to not associate one's brand name with a spectacularly unpopular 
product. Stars proved more consistent measures of quality, as a star's image and roles that they 
played were all carefully planned and controlled. A parallel can be easily drawn to Pixar and 
Disney, whose image represents a particular type of movie, limiting the variability of product and 
giving the audience an idea of what to expect. 
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image in advertising, and often went so far as forcing the actor to change his name or 
lie about certain aspects of his life to ensure the fac;ade that the studio was working 
to generate.8 In exchange, the actor had a relatively stable salary, low risk, and his 
reputation was being built up at the expense of the studio. 
This contract allowed the studio to effectively harvest all windfalls from the star 
they were developing, and though the newly-minted stars often developed egos, their 
power in negotiation remained relatively constant.9 If a star decided to break con-
tract, the studios were quick to bring the issue to court, and never lost. Furthermore, 
a star had no realistic alternative if they decided that they were too big for their 
contract. Not only did the-major studios of the era maintain fantastic working re-
lationships, but a star who broke contract with one studio would not be hired by 
another studio out of fear of being sued themselves for abetting contractual evasion. 
Independent producers were not an option for the fallen star, primarily because inde-
pendent producers largely did not and could not exist given that the major studios 
controlled all major exhibition venues (thereby preventing independent producers 
from having any audience large enough to even break-even on a film's production). 
Given the political economy of the time and the nature of the value chain, the con-
tract demonstrated an interesting equilibrium whereby the studios were able to seize 
the major share of value added by the star. 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
The two main reasons for the studio system's prevalence are best described by Caves 
(2002) in his Creative Industries: 
One reason was efficiency: this was simply the most economically effec-
tive way to organize the production of Hollywood-style films. The other 
reason was rent-seeking: the studios succeeded in intercepting some rents 
imputed to the stars and other film-making talents. Because of the mar-
ket power and entrenchment of the major studios' film distribution and 
exhibition networks, a star could not benefit from competitive bidding for 
8Stories abound about such conditions. Rock Hudson was forced to conceal his homosexuality 
and construct two imaginary marriages to maintain his image as a romantic leading man. Tom 
Cruise was required to say that he'd performed all stunts in MI2 to cement the tagline of the 
movie (Tom Cruise IS Ethan Hunt), when in actuality 6 stunt doubles had been used for his stunts. 
(Epstein 2005). 
9Voluntary renegotiation initiated by the studios did exist, however, in order to maintain good 
working relationships with exceptional stars. Bette Davis' contracts, for example, showed large 
increases in salary over time, as well as reduced number of films that she was required to make 
(Caves 2002) . 
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her services (at least until her contract expired). That the studios thrived 
on both efficient production and successful monopsonyl0 is a hypothesis 
that can be checked against the performance of the new structure that 
replaced it.ll 
The studio system survived and proved highly lucrative for more than a quarter 
century. The system was loath to change; it took three major changes in the envi-
ronment, two market and one legal, to force the studios to evolve to the system in 
place today. 
2.3 Paramount Disintegration and Spot Production 
2.3.1 Tax Considerations 
Around the time of World War II, personal income tax rates skyrocketed to previously 
unheard of levels. With top marginal income tax rates of 94% in 1944 and 1945,12 
the highly paid stars of the era had a strong incentive to form their own production 
companies, thereby reducing their effective tax rates from the draconian 90% to the 
more reasonable 60% corporate tax rate. Caves (2002) explains that the studio heads 
were happy to accommodate their stars (in exchange for lower star fees, of course) 
by signing shorter-term contracts. In so doing, the studio heads had begun to allow 
their stars more freedom from the totalitarian control of previous studio moguls. 
This slippery slope towards greater star independence was the beginning of a shift 
to spot production, where production contracts were geared towards a single film's 
production rather than the previous standard of multi-picture or time-based deals. 
2.3.2 Introduction of the Television 
Few technological innovations have wreaked quite as much havoc on the film industry 
as the television. Studio executives were frozen in fear, and rightfully so. Box office 
sales had already been on the decline, negative costs were on the rise, and now 
content was available free through the use of a television. After years of sitting atop 
a highly lucrative industry not even penetrable by a depression (in actuality, box 
office sales increased throughout the late 1920's and early 1930's), the studio heads 
were unaccustomed to dealing with such a disruptive change to the industry. A swift, 
collective response was required to ward off the new challenge. 
10 A monopsony is a situation where there is only one buyer in a market with many sellers. 
lleaveS (2002), p. 92. 
12IRS (2003). Note: top marginal tax rate was subject to a maximum effective tax rate limitation 
of 90% of net income, though this was still remarkably high. 
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The decided upon course of action was for all studios to refuse to sell content to the 
TV networks. Television is only valuable to consumers if it has programming (similar 
to most other technology adoption, critical mass is required for a new technology to 
be perceived as worth buying), so by starving the television networks of content 
the studios could prevent widespread adoption of the new threatening technology. 
The studios even went so far as to refuse renting their immense sound stages and 
production resources to television networks for production of television content. With 
20-20 hindsight, it is easily seen that in doing so, the studios deprived themselves of 
an immense revenue stream, but the studios perceived threat of television as large 
enough to sacrifice these potential revenues. 
This tactic proved especially disastrous when smaller production companies rushed 
to fill the demand for television programming. Walt Disney paved the way with a 
seven-year contract to produce Disneyland, a weekly, hour-long television show. The 
show served dual purposes as advertising for Disney's emerging empire of characters 
and other licensed goodies and as programming for the new American Broadcast-
ing Network (ABC). A subsidiary of MCA followed suit under the guidance of Lew 
Wasserman by producing game shows and other low-cost programming for the net-
works. Wasserman especially saw an opportunity in packaging programming with the 
talent that MCA represented, securing even higher rents for the company. Other cor-
porate entities followed the pack, seeing the profitability in such a venture. General 
Electric lent its name to MCA's General Electric Theater, as did Alfred Hitchcock 
to Alfred Hitchcock Presents. By the time the studio heads had realized their error, 
programming had reached the so-called 'critical mass,' providing justification for the 
fact that television could be found in 2/3 of all American households by 1959. 
The next major effort by the studios, differentiation, was what ultimately trans-
formed the industry. Realizing that starving the networks for programming was 
largely impossible, they next attempted to differentiate themselves on quality of con-
tent and experience. The studios invested heavily in new technologies to heighten 
the theatrical experience above the typical newsreel and game show fare of TV. To 
enhance the visual experience, the studios shifted production from the 4:3 ratio of 
television programming to a wider format: CinemaScope. Other innovative technolo-
gies were developed, including Cinerama, in which triple projectors were used to show 
films on split screens, and 3D, where audience members were provided with polarized 
glasses that would give certain components of the specially shot film the illusion of 
coming off the screen. Other developed technologies focused more on making going 
to the movies a systatic experience. Most, including a track of time-released aromas 
(Smell-O-Vision), never caught on. Others, including the addition of six channels of 
sound in theaters, changed the way movies are exhibited even to this day. 
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The focus of the movie industry had shifted from ensuring that a constant stream 
of films kept movie theaters filled to providing highly differentiated content that 
could compete with television programming. Speed of delivery was given lower pri-
ority than uniqueness and novelty, characteristics deemed crucial for maintaining 
entertainment market share. As movies became more specialized, the factors of pro-
duction required to make movies were forced to specialize. Studio integration into 
total in-house production no longer offered the cost-saving potential that it did un-
der the previous system. Studios went through a period of heavy divestiture, as 
post-production facilities, costume shops, special effects houses, and other produc-
tion resources were spun off into more-specialized third-party production houses. 
What replaced the earlier studio production system, therefore, was one of flexible 
specialization, where production factors were hired primarily on a one-picture basis. 
These factors are chosen for a particular project based upon timing (availability at 
the exact time necessary) and suitability to the highly-specialized requirements of 
the particular project. This high degree of specialization is readily apparent in the 
drastically rising costs of film production in the 1950's (the average real negative 
cost rose by 33% between 1945 and 1955) coupled with the dramatically decreased 
number of films being produced despite increasing prevalence of independents (the 
5 majors produced 52% less movies in 1956 than they did in 1940). 
2.3.3 US v. Paramount et al (1948) 
The third major agent of change for the structure of the film industry came from the 
legal system. For nearly 10 years the US Justice Department had been working on 
an antitrust suit against the major studios, arguing that practices stemming from 
the studios' 
control of distribution and exhibition mechanisms for feature films constituted re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. As discussed above, the studios 
were highly integrated into the exhibition of movies, ensuring studio-produced films 
better access to consumers than independent films, thereby creating an effective bar-
rier to entry for independent producers and studios. Similarly, the studios utilized 
practices of block booking to force independent exhibitors to take movies that they 
otherwise would not want, giving independent exhibitors a significant competitive 
disadvantage. It was clear that the major studios had effectively constructed a sig-
nificant barrier to entry into exhibition and production. I3 
13De Vany argues compellingly that the characteristics cited by Paramount as barriers of trade 
in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act actually evolved under highly competitive conditions 
and are optimal for the industry on both supply and demand sides. (De Vany 2004, Chapter 7) 
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It took 10 years of appeals and argument at almost every level of the court sys-
tem before the ruling came down against the seven major studios of the time. The 
resulting decrees (issued from 1946-1949) required primarily two extreme changes 
be made by the major studios. First, the studios were required to completely divest 
themselves of all their exhibition halls. Second, the practice of block booking became 
forbidden in dealings with independent theaters.14 These two changes yielded pro-
found changes in the structure of the film industry, and a completely revolutionized 
role the major studios played in it. 
The end of the studios' 
block booking practices signaled greater freedom for independent theaters. No longer 
were they force-fed movies that they knew would not be maximizing profits. While 
this alone did not revolutionize the film exhibition industry, it certainly removed a 
significant competitive advantage that studio-owned theaters had over independents. 
Additionally, this allowed independents the ability to pay higher prices for movies 
they really wanted15 and potentially outbid even studio-owned outlets. This enabled 
them greater flexibility and independence in how they operated, from choosing what 
advertising they contributed to what film,16 to deciding what prices they were able 
to charge for admission. 
When the studios began to sell off their theaters following the Paramount decree, 
a large opportunity opened for independents. The independent theaters during the 
studio era had had inferior locations and largely run-down facilities in comparison to 
the studio-owned theaters. These independents for the most part faded away because 
their inefficient operations were already failing to compete with new challenges like 
the television, and they did not have the price elasticity advantages of movie the-
aters that were successfully exploiting the suburbanization of American cities. Other 
chains rose to take their place, however, and utilized large-scale operations to take 
advantage of economies of scale and run the smaller independents out of the industry. 
With new major players entering the industry, the structure of contracts changed 
significantly. As before, the studios sought to maximize rentals at the box office (ie 
the more people that buy a ticket to a movie, the more revenue the studio receives). 
Since the studios no longer owned the theaters, the box office rentals had to be shared 
between theater and studio. Specific contract details were negotiated on a per picture 
14It should be noted, however, that the end of block booking pertains only to domestic theaters. 
The practice of block booking continues today through the studios' 
international distribution arms, as anti-trust law does not rule international trade. 
15 Again, see Caves (2002) for an argument in favor of block booking. (Caves 2002, p. 163-165) 
16Early advertising was financed completely at the theater level, and usually was composed simply 
of the movie's name on the theater's marquee, the occasional poster with a star's likeness in the 
theater lobby, and a movie trailer (so called because it originally trailed the feature picture). 
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basis between the studios and the theaters,17 but the industry standard became a 
sliding scale where the majority of opening weekend revenue (oftentimes as much as 
90%) were given to the studios with each successive week shifting along the scale in 
favor of the theater. As a general benchmark, studios end up receiving approximately 
50% of domestic box office rentals; the larger studios receive an intuitive higher 
percentage (52-53% generally go to Warner Brothers, Fox, etc while New Line receives 
around 48%) .18 
The forced divestiture by studios of their exhibition arms surprisingly did not 
propel as much change in exhibition as it did in production. Suddenly, the virtually 
oligopolistic hold on film exhibition had been lifted. Independent producers finally 
had potential outlets for their works, making movies produced independently finan-
cially viable (or at least offered potential viability). Perhaps less intuitively, this gave 
star actors and directors a new degree of independence and power in negotiations as 
well. Under the earlier system of 7-year star contracts, studios had great leverage 
in negotiations because of the effective monopoly they held on theaters - if stars 
broke or did not renew their contracts, they had no alternative source for work. Lew 
Wasserman, president of an enormous talent agency, MCA, correctly foresaw that 
the Paramount settlement would allow for greater ability of the stars to capture the 
rents they generated. In the years leading up to the Paramount decrees, Wasserman 
aggressively expanded MCA's movie component by signing numerous stars and ac-
quiring multiple competing talent agencies, anticipating the day when this could be 
translated into leverage at the negotiating table, which would in turn generate large 
commissions for MCA. By 1948, thanks in large part to Wasserman's business acu-
men and foresight, nearly half of all stars under contract to the studios were signed 
by MCA. 
When the Paramount ruling came down, just such an opportunity arose. With 
independent producers entering the film market, producers had to compete for the 
stars that could open a movie. Wasserman parlayed this new leverage into a contrac-
tual innovation that forever changed the relationship between studio and star: the 
participation agreement. According to Epstein (2005),Wasserman in 1950 managed 
to secure a deal for his client, Jimmy Stewart, in which he would receive 50% of 
profits of Universal's Winchester 73 for his starring role - a substantial step up from 
his $50,000 salary for a comparable role just 2 years earlier. Weinstein (1998) traces 
17The larger theater chains had considerably more leverage than smaller independents, and could 
typically negotiate better deals with the studios. Ironically, the Paramount decree broke up a highly 
concentrated exhibition industry only to yield another highly concentrated exhibition industry. 




the origins of participation contracts earlier to David Belasko and Warner in 1923, 
and cites other examples including Al Jolson's first-dollar gross participation con-
tract, explained below. In its early form, participation contracts were rarely used by 
the more stable studios (eg MGM) while the weaker studios (eg Warner and RKO) 
occasionally opted for their inclusion with top stars, typically for a combination of 
cash constraint and risk sharing motives. The studios were able to forego a large 
upfront payment, which, though it implied an often-larger payment after release, 
made it considerably easier to raise capital to get a project off the ground. As the 
stars' 
leverage in negotiations increased, participation contracts moved from being the ex-
ception to being the rule, even for lower level stars. 
This paper has argued that it was increased leverage and decreased amount of 
stars who could open a movie that were the major arbiters of change in star contracts, 
but Ravid (2003) enumerates a number of benefits of participation contracts for 
the studios. First, profit-sharing offers a potential solution to agency problems by 
aligning incentives. Secondly, as previously discussed participation contracts allows 
for sharing of project risk. According to Weinstein (1998), variation of movie revenues 
has increased over time, so increasing movie risk offers perhaps an especially pertinent 
explanation for percentage deals. Thirdly, a star accepting a participation offer may 
indicate that the actor knows something more about a movie than the studio does and 
thus values it more. This may help overcome an asymmetric information problem. 
Finally, as mentioned above, participation contracts save the studio a potentially 
large upfront free, making initial capital considerably easier to raise. 
Contracts with the stars, as a result of MCA and other talent agencies' 
efforts, now take one of three forms, or a combination thereof: 
1. Fixed Fee: A fixed fee is guaranteed to the star for their participation. For 
larger stars, this is more often than not treated contractually as an advance of 
one of the following two participation agreements. 
2. Gross Participation: Generally only granted to the top stars, this type of agree-
ment offers the star a percentage of gross revenues. 19 The much sought-after 
first-dollar gross participation agreement implies a percentage of gross receipts 
19Typically gross revenues' implies only domestic box office or in rare cases domestic and inter-
national box office revenues, but in special cases the percentage can be pegged to other ancillary 
markets as well. Arnold Schwarzenegger, for example received a first-dollar gross participation 
agreement on domestic, international, home video, and merchandise markets for his role in Termi-
nator 3. 
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from the first revenue dollar, while more common is a percentage of gross after 
some breakpoint is reached. 
3. Net Participation: Much more common with all but the top stars in Holly-
wood, this type of contract offers a percentage of revenues after the break-even 
point has been reached. These changed terms were a significant contributor 
to the sharp increase in negative costs20 since Paramount, and have played an 
enormous role in shaping the structure of production costs of movies today. 
2.3.4 Summary 
The average cost of producing a film in 2004 was $63.6 million, with average per 
picture marketing expenditure well over $30 million.21 There are now almost 37,000 
movie screens in the US, an increasing number of which are digital and feature more 
advanced technology than could have been imagined even a decade ago. The motion 
picture industry has become a mainstay of American culture, resisting and evolving 
in light of Depression, legal and policy shifts, and intense market threats. This 
evolution is most exemplified by the changes in contractual arrangements enumerated 
above. This paper will now examine the primary cost structures employed by the 
film industry today in an effort to examine whether one is financially dominant or 
dominated. 
3 Economic Model 
3.1 Introduction 
This model is an attempt to simulate the basic decision of production in the film 
industry after a project has been green-lighted: whether to complete production of 
the film. Traditional economics dictates that, at the margin, an investment should be 
undertaken if and only if the marginal revenue of that decision exceeds its marginal 
cost. Furthermore, any expenditure made prior to the decision point that is not 
recoverable should be treated as a sunk cost, and thus not factored into the decision 
in any way. This model extends these economic intuitions to the film industry, 
illustrating that: 
20 Negative costs are the costs of producing the physical negative of a film. These costs include 
production costs, studio overhead, and capitalized interest. 
21 Figures from MPA (2004b). 
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1. Decisions to continue production of a film that producers know will be poorly 
received may still be both rational and optimal; and 
2. Different organizations of production costs result in strikingly different produc-
tion decisions. 
This section will first state and describe the assumptions of the model, then examine 
the processes of the model and how decisions are made, and will finally discuss the 
model's implications. 
3.2 Assumptions 
Consider a three period economy: 
Let tk, (k =0,1,2) represent period k 
In this economy there is one firm, m, which is characterized as being able to produce 
one movie in a three period timeframe. In the production of a movie, total cost is 
composed of an exogenously given variable cost component (V) that is distributed 
evenly over the course of production (ie 1/2V is expended at tl and 1/2V is expended 
at t 2 ) and an exogenously given fixed cost component (F) that is paid in one lump 
sum at one point in time, such that total cost of production of a movie is defined by 
the equation, 
TC= V+F (1) 
The fixed costs of production of a movie are greater than the variable production 
costs, so 
F >V (2) 
The firm can have one of two possible cost structures, illustrated in Figure 1 on 
the following page. In the first possible structure (Frontloaded), F is paid at to, 
while V is evenly distributed throughout the production process. In the second 
possible structure (Backloaded), F is paid at tb while V is again evenly distributed 
throughout. In addition, the firm has a characteristic, quality (Q), that is randomly 
determined and can take one of two values, Good or Bad. At to, the variable Q is 
completely unknown to the firm. At t1 , a perfect signal of quality is revealed, so the 
variable Q is known to the firm with 100% certainty. We can therefore characterize 
a type of firm, m, as 
mi = m(structurei, qualitYi) 












Figure 1: Representative cost curves of the two modeled cost structures, with per-
centage total cost and time on the vertical and horizontal axes respectively. (A) 
represents structure Frontloaded, with a high upfront percentage of total cost. (B) 
depicts structure Backloaded, with fixed cost expenditure at tl 
such that 
T R = {T Rl if quality = good 
T R2 if quality = bad 
1/2V < TR2 < F + V < TRI 
(4) 
(5) 
Finally, as in most economic models, it is assumed that the firm's objective is to 
maximize profits, so the firm seeks to maximize: 
7r = TR - TC (6) 
3.3 Processes 
For each t k , the firm has two possible actions, Continue or Stop, and since the firm 
is a profit maximizer (as given in equation 6 above), its optimal strategy function is: 
fk = f(MC, E[M RJ) = {Continue ~f MC :::; M R 
Stop If MC > MR (7) 
Because of the nature of revenues in the industry, MR = a if the movie is not 
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Figure 2: Decision tree for m (frontloaded) 
a one player dynamic decision tree, as shown in figures 2 and 3 on page 20. The 
dashed rectangle around the nodes in period 1 indicate incomplete information - at 
to, as the quality of the movie is unknown. Because incomplete information occurs, 
a harsanyi transformation is performed in the model, presenting nature as initial 
decider of quality before production actually begins. 
If at tl the quality is revealed to be Good, the firm's dominant strategy is to 
continue production of the movie regardless of what cost structure the firm has 
because profit for completion is positive by equation 5. 
In the event that quality is deemed Bad, significant differences occur. For a firm 
with cost structure Frontloaded, the majority of the cost (F + 1/2V) is to be treated 
as a sunk cost at tl, when the quality signal is revealed. The relevant comparison at tl 
then is the marginal cost (1/2V) and the marginal revenue of completion (T R2)' By 
equation 5 above, it is evident that completion of the film under this cost structure 
is the rational and optimal choice because T R2 - (1/2V) > O. Even though the net 
profit of the film's production is negative, the choice to complete the film is rational 
purely because of how much of the cost is sunk in before the quality of the film is 
known. 
This is not the case for a firm of cost structure Backloaded. At time t l , only 












Figure 3: Decision tree for m (backloaded) 
revenue of completion must be greater than F+ 1/2V, which is only true when quality 
of the film is Good. Under this cost structure, a firm will always stop production if 
quality is revealed to be Bad. 
If it is assumed that Good and Bad quality films are equally likely, it is possible 
to easily calculate the expected profits of each type of cost structure: 
E[7r{FTontloaded)] = .5{TRI - (F + V)) + .5(TR2 - (F + V)) 
E[7f(Backloaded)] = .5(TRl - (F+ V)) + .5(-.5V) 
And, by equations 2 and 5, E[7f(Backloaded)] > E[7r(Frontloaded)] . Furthermore, 
because (T R2 - (F + V)) < (-.5 V), Backloaded dominates Frontloaded regardless 
of the probabilities associated with quality. The inequalities in equation 5 used to 
constrain the possible revenues were chosen largely to demonstrate how cost structure 
could lead to different optimal strategies. Different revenue summations do not 
significantly alter the interpretation of the model. If T R2 > F + V, it would follow 
that the film would not be halted regardless of cost structure as it would always turn 
a profit. Similarly, if T Rl < F + V, neither a Bad nor a Good film would have a 
positive net cash flow, so the film would be halted regardless of cost structure. It can 
thus be said that in this model, the expected value of a firm with a cost structure 
exhibiting high up front costs is lower than one exhibiting low initial costs because 
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the latter has the opportunity to halt production once a signal for film quality is 
revealed. 
3.4 Implications 
This model presents a simplified version of a number of key features of the modern 
day film industry, so, while relatively simple, its predictive power is striking. Ex-
ecutives at the major studios constantly attempt to find the next big smash, but 
the number of unsuccessful feature films produced annually points to the "nobody 
knows any thing" nature of the industry (Caves 1991). Industry executives agree that 
picking the right script is much more luck than skill, so modeling the uncertainty 
with a harsanyi transformation at the outset seems appropriate. 
Additionally, as discussed in the earlier literature review, the vast majority of 
films today are characterized by an extremely large proportion of production costs 
being expended at the very early stages of production. As the model demonstrates, 
if high fixed costs are exhibited up front, it is the dominant strategy to continue 
production in an attempt to recoup as much of the investment as possible. While 
the economic model detailed above shows the different optimal strategies for drasti-
cally different cost structures, the argument can be easily generalized. The general 
argument can be made: 
Let C1 and C2 be the cost curves of two movies that are identical in every 
way except for the structure of their cost curve. 
(8) 
Specifically, the concavity of a film's cost curve positively affects the percentage of 
total cost incurred prior to revelation of a film's quality. Decisions made when that 
revelation occurs are wholly dependent on the marginal cost of the film project, not 
the estimated total project cost. These decisions to complete production are therefore 
directly influenced by the concavity of a film's cost curve. Greater concavity results 
in a larger portion of costs being incurred before quality is known, so the probability 
of such a film's completion regardless of quality is larger. If it is later discovered 
that such a film's likelihood of commercial success is low, the expected profits of the 
film become potentially low or even negative. Had the concavity of the curve been 
smaller, the proportion of costs incurred prior to this discovery would have been 
similarly smaller, resulting in a different probability of completing a film that would 
be poorly received. We therefore expect greater concavity to be strongly related to 
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Figure 4: Temporal Cost Curve of a high initial fixed cost movie 
4 Econometric Model 
In reality, the cost structure of film production is not quite as clear-cut as the above 
model indicates. Major players in a film (main actors, writers, director, producer, 
etc) are typically given both a fixed fee that is guaranteed regardless of the movie's 
completion (pay-or-play) and a participation portion of the contract whereby the 
player is given either a certain portion of the movie's revenue or they're given certain 
fees at negotiated break points in a film's gross. For the purpose of analysis, the 
revenue-sharing portion of the contracts are not included in production costs as they 
ought to be considered a form of revenue distribution rather than an additional cost 
of production, and are thus not factored into decisions of whether to complete a film. 
A cost curve for a typical modern-day movie can be found in Figure 4 above. At 
to, the script has been green-lighted for production with at least one major player 
(typically either a main actor or director) attached to the project, as indicated by 
the positive y-intercept. The stepwise figures are a result of additional major players 
being added to the film; each step signifies a certain guaranteed pay-or-play fee 
promised to the player, which is treated as a sunk cost as it is not recoverable. Time 
tr represents the release date of the picture, and t2 represents the approximate point 
at which market research begins to give some sense for the commercial quality of the 
film. 
Additionally, it is generally understood that the producers of a film have a degree 
of choice in determining their film's concavity. Because of the time value of money, 
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it would ordinarily be much preferred to not spend any of the total cost of a produc-
tion until as far into the future as possible. In film production, though, a tradeoff 
exists between the time value of money and higher total costs. In determining cost 
structure, a producer must decide whether to give a fixed fee to a participant today 
or offer a percentage of revenues or profits at a later date. We must assume that pro-
ducers seek to maximize returns, so they determine the optimal distribution for each 
film project based upon a risk assessment of participation contracts, while simulta.-
neously taking into account the heterogeneity of components in the film process. In 
the following analysis, we assume that each film project has an optimal concavity 
that is determined by the producers. We treat a film's cost curve's concavity as an 
ex ante characteristic of a film project very similar to other film demographics used 
in box office receipt forecasting. 
To offer empirical evidence for the above economic model, a relationship between 
concavity of a film's cost curve and its financial success must be established empir-
ically. Econometrically, the basic relationship to be established can be summarized 
by the equations, 
(9) 
and 
K· = '(G - ~ *t)dt l
b' t 
~ 0 ~ TCi 
(10) 
where Ri = return on investment to film i 
Ki = a measure of the concavity of film i's cost curve, defined as the difference 
between the area under film i's cost curve and the uniform cost curve. 
Ci = the percentage of the cost of film i expended at time t 
tri = the time at which film i is released 
TCi = the percentage of the cost of film i expended at time tri; namely, 100. 
If /31 < 0, we interpret this to mean that films with higher concavity on average have 
lower rates of return, but do not conclude that a particular film could have exhibited 
a higher rate of return had it had a less concave cost curve. This analysis is useful, 
therefore, not in determining the optimal level of concavity for a particular film, but 
instead as an aid in choosing a particular film, given its endogenous optimal cost 
structure. 
23 
Before delving further into the estimation, it will be helpful to explain what 
exactly is meant by the terms revenue and profitability in the movie industry, and 
to discuss the academic literature's treatment of the subject. 
4.1 Revenues and Profitability 
Revenue in the film industry can mean many different things. During the era of 
film's genesis, film revenues came from one place only: domestic box office. As 
world economies grow more interconnected through globalizing forces, international 
box office has become an increasing source of film revenue. Certain movies, usually 
discernible by greater demand from children and families, have significant tie-ins to 
merchandising and other ancillary markets. Disney's revenues in particular show a 
huge licensing component for it's memorable characters, huge merchandising oppor-
tunities, as well as amusement parks based solely on the intellectual property created 
by their movies. Finally, most studio executives agree that the most important and 
growing source of revenue today is the home video market, which encompasses VHS 
and DVD rentals, as well as video and DVD sales and the newer Internet video-on-
demand services starting to appear. 
Early academic studies of the film industry focus primarily on forecasting do-
mestic box office revenues based on ex ante demographics of a film. The first of 
two main explanations for this is that when many earlier studies were undertaken, 
domestic box office accounted for the largest portion of total film revenues. Secondly, 
actual data for ancillary markets are much more difficult to attain as most of these 
markets continue in perpetuity, and figures are usually closely guarded by the highly 
secretive studios. Domestic box office, on the other hand, has been routinely tracked 
by many firms, and has become somewhat of a national phenomenon with box office 
figured posted daily in periodicals like Variety. Additionally, as will be discussed 
below, significant correlation was shown between domestic box office and most an-
cillary markets, so the focus on domestic box office was useful at the very least as a 
proxy for total revenues in academic study, if not interpreted as total revenues itself. 
According to Ravid (2005), though, domestic theatrical revenues now account for 
less than 20% on average of a film's total revenues, which he uses to call for greater 
focus on the harder-to-acquire ancillary market revenue data. Similarly, Vogel (2001) 
illustrates that the gross revenue derived from home video has exceeded that from 
domestic box office since even the late 1980's. If correlation between domestic box 
office and ancillary markets remains despite change in total revenue makeup, it might 
still be useful to rely on domestic box office as a proxy when other market data is 
unattainable. 
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Studies of correlation between domestic and foreign box office figures appear en-
couraging. In a study of 175 major movies released between 1991 and 1993, Ravid 
and Basuroy (2003) find a correlation of r=0.86 between domestic and foreign box 
office revenues. Weinberg (2003) compared domestic and international box office fig-
ures for the 100 largest box office films in the US in 2001 and reported a correlation 
of r=.88. In our analysis of a considerably smaller dataset, we find evidence corrob-
orating these results, showing a similar correlation of r=.921, significant at the 1% 
level between domestic and foreign box office results for 23 motion pictures. 
Early studies on the correlation between domestic box office and video rentals 
proved similarly encouraging. Ravid and Basuroy (2003), returning to their 175 
movies released between 1991 and 1993, found a correlation between domestic box 
office and video revenues of r=.70. At this time, however, the vast majority of home 
entertainment revenue stemmed from movie copies sold to rental companies for high 
prices (around $60 a piece); the concept of sell-through pricing had not yet been 
adopted. Weinberg (2003) analyzed the top 100 movies released in the US in 2001 
and found correlation between domestic box office with DVD sales of r=.81, though 
other ancillary markets showed decreasing degrees of correlation.22 The data used 
in this paper was not separated into various home video components, but a similar 
general correlation between domestic box office and total home video revenues was 
found with r=.525. Lehman and Weinberg (2000) used substantially more complex 
tools of analysis to demonstrate that a video's sales and rate of decay are signifi-
cantly related to performance of the film in the domestic box office. In their paper, 
Lehman and Weinberg explain that different release dates, pricing strategies, and 
other managerial actions could change the revenue distribution of a film, and sug-
gests that domestic box office's reliability as a predictor of video revenues stems 
primarily from the industry having a relatively fixed decision rule of when to release 
a video (approximately 6 months, though this length has decreased slightly since the 
paper was published). This assertion implies that profit-maximizing video distribu-
tors could change practice to increase revenues and would in doing so decrease the 
predictive power of box office revenue. Additionally, many have hypothesized that 
the DVD, with the potential for inclusion of many features not seen in theaters or on 
VHS, is increasingly seen by consumers as a product different from what is shown at 
the theaters, indicating that the markets may not be as related as formerly thought 
(Weinberg 2003; Ravid 2005; Epstein 2005). With DVD player penetration at only 
43.1% of US households in 2003,23 we can only expect this effect to increase in the 
22Domestic box office with VHS sales, DVD rentals, and VHS sales respectively were r=.55, 




Other ancillary markets have not been studied as thoroughly as international 
box office and home video. An executive at Warner Brothers explained that network 
deals and other ancillary markets are often pegged to domestic box office figures,24 
but merchandising revenues are greatly affected by genre, rating, and, more generally, 
target audience. In our data sample, a significant correlation between domestic box 
office and total revenues was found with r=.815, but we feel strongly because of the 
arguments above that it is important to examine both domestic and total revenues 
in our analysis. 
As Ravid (2005) wrote, "it's easy to produce movies that make a lot of money 
- just put in a lot of money. However, that may not be the profit-maximizing 
strategy."25 The economic model presented earlier seeks to establish a relationship 
between the concavity of a film's cost curve and its profitability. Profitability mea-
sures in the film industry, however, are remarkably elusive, primarily because of 
complex accounting tools utilized by the studios. The film Gone in 60 Seconds, for 
example, was touted by Disney as a major commercial success, grossing $242 million 
in the world-wide box office with production costs totaling only $103 million. Profit 
statements, however, showed that the movie was produced at a large loss. Why? 
Marketing expenditures topped $60 million, physical prints cost $13 million, another 
$10 million was spent on insurance, local taxes, and customs clearances, $17 mil-
lion was charged for studio overhead, and another $41 million for interest accrued 
during production. The movie in total ended up costing a staggering $206.5 mil-
lion. Additionally, as discussed before, box office gross gets split between theaters 
and distributors, so only about $140 million actually made it on the revenue side to 
Disney, yielding an overall loss of $160 million. Additionally, gross participants' per-
centage of revenues are factored into costs of production before any net participant 
is paid, shifting the breakeven point even further. The vast majority of these details 
go unreported, and are very difficult to account for in empirical analysis performed 
by studio outsiders. 'This movie is not abnormalnearly all movies follow a similar 
pattern. Accounting for profitability is thus a very difficult proposition in the film 
industry. 
Most of the relevant literature sought to forecast some semblance of revenues 
based upon film demographics. Ravid (1999) expanded the literature empirically 
by focusing on forecasting economic profitability of films . Realizing the difficulty in 
measuring profitability, Ravid constructed a proxy for economic returns using the 
24Based on an interview with a studio executive at Warner Brothers personally conducted on 
3/21/05. 
25Ravid (2005), p. 6 
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most easily accessible and measurable variables available: revenues/negative cost, 
where negative cost is the cost of producing a film's negatives. This measure is, 
more simply, 1 + (return on initial investment). In using this as a proxy, it is 
assumed that advertising and distribution expenditures are in constant proportion 
to negative coStS. 26 It must be noted that as this proxy is constructed, a ratio for 
a film of greater than one does not imply that the film broke even. The proxy is 
useful in comparison, though, in that if one film has a higher ratio than another, it 
is possible to claim that the first was more profitable than the second. 
Countless factors have been shown in the. academic literature to have a relation-
ship with film revenues and/or film profitability. This paper will now examine the 
literature on each of these main factors, and use this knowledge to control for these 
factors in its later estimation of the above equation. 
4.2 Budgets 
First, a definition of terms: the term negative cost is defined in the literature as 
the costs incurred to produce the initial negative of a film. This cost includes de-
velopment, production, and post-production expenditure, but does not include pro-
motional or distributional considerations. General economic intuition indicates that 
spending more money on factors of production yields additional revenue. This re-
sult has been confirmed in multiple studies (Ravid 1999; Ravid 2003; Moul 2005; 
Ravid 2005). Studies relating negative cost to profitability are scarce. Ravid (1999) 
demonstrates a significant negative relationship between the log of negative cost and 
his profitability proxy, indicating that larger movies yield, on average, lower rates 
of return. Ravid (2003) shows similar results. Ravid (2005), however, shows that 
negative cost is not significantly related to rate of return. These divergent results 
indicate that negative cost warrants inspection in our analysis. 
4.3 Marketing 
In a market with imperfect information, marketing is thought to increase awareness 
of product and therefore increase demand. The movie industry, an industry with no 
real branding effect, requires that a new market be created for each individual film. 
Because consumers tend to see a movie only once, Moul (2005) argues that movies 
exhibit characteristics associated with durable goods. He continues, explaining that 
while durable goods typically follow a quadratic diffusion pattern, movies tend to 
26Ravid(1999) showed this assumption to be a valid one, with correlations so high that there were 
problems running regressions with all costs present as individual regressors. 
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follow a pattern of high opening and steady decline over time. For this to be the 
case, Moul argues, word-of-mouth effects must be dominated by advertising effects. 
The drastically increased advertising budgets of movies over the past few decades 
certainly do not contradict the hypothesis that studios have generally adopted an 
advertising scheme intended to overwhelm word-of-mouth, but this theory remains 
to be tested empirically. 
Radas and Shugan (1998), in contrast, deseasonalized data on 673 films released 
between 1991 and 1993, and came to the conclusion that most advertising seems to 
accelerate time, shifting later sales to earlier time periods. They theorize, therefore, 
that advertising does not actually increase total demand, but rather changes the time 
at which that demand is acted upon. Timing in the film industry is critical, though. 
If a person foregoes watching Terminator 3 one week to see it in a few weeks, a few 
weeks down the road a whole new array of movie consumption options confront them. 
This theory requires further empirical work, but it is clear that marketing has at least 
some economic role in determining revenues. Because we assume marketing exhibits 
diminishing marginal returns, marketing has relevance to profitability analysis as 
well. 
4.4 Stars 
The film industry is unique in that every movie produced is a new product, for which 
an individual market must be created. Unlike many industries, film does not easily 
lend itself to branding efforts. Studios produce films of constant technical quality, 
but content varies widely from project to project, rendering studio names ineffective 
branding mechanisms. Much of the academic literature has focused on the role of 
the star as a branding tool, describing a star's inclusion in a project as a signal to 
the potential viewers of anything ranging from the movie's genre to quality of the 
project. Since the early use of stars in films, a star's persona on and off-screen has 
been carefully crafted. Stars that step beyond their image typically find their star 
power diminished.27 This effect supports the star branding theory. Additionally, 
Moul (2004) argues that the true benefit of stars is the free ink, or externalities 
associated with news about a star that aid a movie's name recognition. Late night 
television shows often feature these stars in interviews that offer a free opportunity 
for the studios to advertise their movie. Numerous other hypotheses of the effect of 
27Winona Ryder's shoplifting arrest in 2002, for example, conflicted with her innocent on and 
off-screen persona, so it became increasingly difficult to cast her in roles of that type because the 
audience had a much harder time accepting her in that type of role. The fees she was able to 
command therefore took a hit as well. (See Epstein 2005) 
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stars exist; it is clear that stars have become an important component of the film 
industry. 
Numerous studies exist supporting the hypothesis that inclusion of a star increases 
domestic revenues. Litman (1989) shows that participation of stars has a significant 
positive relationship with revenues. Ravid (1999) includes international and home 
video revenue in his data sample and similarly concludes that stars have a positive 
effect on total revenues. In this study, Ravid includes a number of alternative star 
definitions including past Academy Award nominations, past movie gross, and an 
ordinal variable measuring the effect of multiple academy award nominations and/or 
wins. In his sample, all star variables demonstrated a significant effect on total film 
revenues. 
As Ravid (1999) points out, however, there are two competing economic con-
cepts in the use of stars. The first, as discussed above, is that of signaling with an 
expensive star, which should increase revenues. The second, rent capture, dictates 
that stars should capture all their added value in equilibrium. Stars are paid inor-
dinate amounts of money to appear in movies, often in up-front fees. With fewer 
stars who can open a movie, star costs are escalating even further. 28 De Vany (1999) 
sought to address these contradictory economic concepts, and found that controlling 
for presence of a star -had no statistical significance with respect to profitability. De 
Vany's study, though, made use only of domestic box office data. He then remarked 
on apparent heterogeneity of stars and very different resulting effects. To measure 
these effects, he ran regressions using individual controls for each person on Vari-
ety's Top 100 Most Powerful People in Hollywood'list put out annually by Variety. 
Ultimately he concluded that the estimated effects of these stars was not useful, as 
past performance in film has little effect on future success. 
Ravid (1999) expanded on this work by measuring the effect of a star on profitabil-
ity in film, using his proxy of total revenues/negative cost for return on investment. 
While his study demonstrated a positive significant star effect on total revenues, his 
analysis showed presence of a star to be insignificant with respect to profitability. 
Based on his and other results, De Vany (2004) draws the conclusions that the rela-
tionship between stars and demand are too complex to model, namely because stars 
have a high degree of choice of projects, individual stars have individual effects, and 
these effects are rapidly and constantly changing. Albert (1998), in response to De 
Vany's conclusion, argues that the presence of a star in a movie does not simply 
ensure higher or lower profitability, but rather that it actually shifts the movie to a 
different probability distribution of success. This paper will look at the star's effect 
28Based on comments from a personal interview on 1/24/05 with a top executive at a major 
studio. 
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on both revenues and returns in an effort to corroborate or offer empirical evidence 
against De Vany's random-pattern theory. 
4.5 Rating 
Since the inception of the MPAA's first rating system in 1968, revenue patterns have 
started to emerge that show large differences between movies of different ratings. In 
general, movies with a G rating are geared towards families. These movies typically 
have a much larger degree of merchandising tie-ins that can tap into huge revenue 
streams not accessible by R-rated movies. Disney's golden formula of low cost movies 
with licensable content geared at families and children exploited the different ancil-
lary market opportunities. Disregarding merchandising though, box office and home 
video revenue distribution differences between G and R-rated movies are quite large. 
One simple economic argument is market size; G and PG movies, and arguably PG 13 
as well, have a much larger potential market than R-rated movies. 
This hypothesis has significant empirical support in the literature. Most recently, 
Fee (2002) finds that G-rated movies have a significantly positive effect on revenues 
relative to movies of other ratings. He finds this effect holds when the dependent 
variable is his proxy for profitability (domestic box office/negative cost), though this 
argument is weaker as it takes into account only domestic box office and, as discussed 
above, correlation between domestic box office and ancillary markets appears to be 
weakening. De Vany (2004) similarly demonstrates that R-rated films are dominated 
by other ratings in terms of revenues, returns on production cost, and their proxy for 
real profit.29 Ravid (1999) shows similar results hold for total revenues and a proxy 
for profitability calculated using revenues from domestic, international, and home 
video markets - family friendly ratings (G and PG) appear to increase revenues and 
returns relative to less family-friendly ratings. 
4.6 Seasonality 
Looking at a breakdown of movie attendees, it is readily apparent why there may 
be seasonality factors at play in film revenue distributions. As a market segment, 
teenagers account for nearly a third of all movie attendees, though teenagers only 
account for roughly 15% of the civilian population. Additionally, 88% of the teen 
29De Vany's proxy for real profit is one half domestic box office revenues minus negative cost. 
This is an adequate proxy for profit if we assume that i) the producers' share of theatrical revenues 
is 50%, ii) ancillary markets are highly correlated with domestic box office, but is a useful proxy 
for relative profitability within the domestic market nonetheless. 
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population that attends movies does so frequently, compared with only 28% of movie-
goers overall. 30 It is unsurprising, then, that total box office appears to peak when 
school is not in session. Moul (2005) roughly offers econometric evidence of this 
effect, showing a significantly positive effect of a holiday on total box office gross. 
The market for movies, though, is a competitive one. If it is clear that a holiday 
release is more profitable and that film release date is chosen by producers, there 
should be significant clustering of movies around holiday times. This increased com-
petition should at the very least dilute the effect of a holiday opening, if not negate it 
completely. As Einav (2002) explains, the observed seasonal pattern of [movie] sales 
is a combination of both seasonality in underlying demand and seasonal variation 
in the quality of movies released. By decomposing the seasonality effect into these 
two components, Einav (2002) concludes that seasonal demand patterns are actually 
much smaller than the industry believes, resulting in too many holiday openings. 
Radas and Shugan (1998) similarly realize these contradictory effects of seasonal 
demand and endogenous release choice. In their analysis, they examine 673 films 
released between 1991 and 1993. By de-seasonalizing the revenue figures, Radas and 
Shugan produce evidence that competitive movies have the ability to expand the 
market beyond seasonal effects. Based upon these empirical results, it appears that 
release date has a significant role in determining revenues, so holiday release will be 
controlled for in this paper's analysis. 
4.7 Awards 
Many Hollywood executives believe that an academy award nomination or win will 
yield increased post-Oscar revenues. A relationship between an Oscar win and prof-
itability has yet to be established, though Litman and Kohl (1989) demonstrate a 
weak relationship between a nomination for best picture and revenues. Nominations 
in other categories or a win in the best picture category are not shown to significantly 
contribute to film revenues. 
4.8 Cost Structure 
As discussed in the economic model above, this paper hypothesizes that the structure 
of costs throughout production has a significant effect on rate of return because 
of economic theory of sunk costs and the cost v. revenue decisions made at the 
margin. The general equations that we wish to estimate, based upon Ravid (1999)'s 
30 Figures from the MPA(2004a). The study defines a frequent moviegoer as someone who goes 
to the movie at least once a month. 
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specification, are: 
In(TOTRE~) = al + f3l ln(NEGATIVEi) + f32 ln(MARKETINGi) 
+ 6lSTARi + 62RATINGi + 63 HOLIDAY;, + 64AWARDi (11) 
and 
ROli = a2 + f33 ln(NEGATIVEi) + f34 ln(MARKETINGi) + f35 Ki 
+ 65 STARi + 66 RATINGi + 67HOLIDAY;, + 6sAWARDi (12) 
where TOT REVi = total revenues from box office and ancillary markets for film i 
RO Ii = a measure of profitability of film i 
Ki = the proxy for concavity of film i's cost curve 
NEG AT IV Ei = the negative cost of film i 
MARK ET I N Gi = expenditure on marketing for film i 
STARi = a dummy variable controlling for presence of a star 
RAT I NGi = a dummy variable taking 1 if rating is not R 
HOLIDAY;, = a dummy variable controlling for holiday release 
AW ARDi = a dummy variable controlling for oscar nominations or wins 
While we cannot estimate these equations as given because of data considerations 
discussed in the following section, these equations will be estimated in a series of 
separate steps. Expected first derivatives based upon the economic and econometric 
reasons discussed above are: 
dNEGATIVE dMARKETING 
dTOTREV' dTOTREV > 0 
dK 
dROI < 0 
All other first derivatives do not have expected signs, stemming from contradicting 
economic intuition discussed above. 
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5 Data 
The data were collected from a number of sources. The sample collected consists 
of 23 movies released by a major studio between 1995 and 2000. This time interval 
serves two useful purposes: i) it allows enough time for ancillary market revenues to 
accrue, and ii) it was the time interval for which I was able to acquire data. The 
data for each movie falls into one of three categories. 
First, information was gathered on costs accrued in the production of each film. 
This information was compiled from information received directly from contacts at 
the major studios who have chosen to retain anonymity. For each film, details of all 
above-the-line contracts were compiled. The relevant portion of these contractual 
details includes fixed fee components, structure of participation components, and 
date signed. Additionally, an overall breakdown of other costs was compiled for each 
film. Exact marketing expenditures come from this cost breakdown, as do number of 
weeks of production. Any guaranteed fee was treated as spent on the day that it was 
guaranteed by contract. These guaranteed above-the-line fees will be known as fixed 
costs from this point forward. Other costs not attributed to above-the-line contracts 
will be termed variable costs. In constructing a cost curve over time for each film, 
variable costs are assumed to be spent at a constant rate over the duration of the 
production. This assumption was confirmed as relatively accurate by executives at 
several studios. The cost curve for each film was constructed in this manner from 
greenlight to release. 
Our proxy for the concavity of each film's cost curve, K, was constructed in the 
following way. Each film's length of production was standardized to one year. Costs 
over the year were standardized as a percentage of total cost at time t. For the 52 
weeks, 
52 
Ki = L%Gx - %UGx 
n=l 
where Gx = the actual cost expended in week x; and 
UGx = the amount that would have been expended in week x if the cost 
had been evenly distributed over entire time period (ie the Uniform Cost Curve) 
so that K measures the sum of the difference between actual cost and average 
cost for each week. In a sense, it is a Riemann sum estimation of the difference 
between the areas under the actual and uniform cost curves of each film. It is a 
useful measure for comparing the concavities of two films' 
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cost curves, but is not meaningful purely as a number. K, as constructed, has a 
theoretical maximum of 600 and minimum of O. 
Second, information was gathered on revenues received for each film. A full 
breakdown of all revenues from box office and all ancillary markets was compiled 
from information received directly from the studios. Revenues reported are the exact 
revenues relegated to the studios, and thus differ substantially from overall estimated 
box office gross reported in Variety and the like. Half of the films' 
revenues are accurate as of 1/26/05, and the other half is accurate as of 3/18/05. 
The portion of revenues accrued during this 2 month period is minimal, and far too 
small to significantly affect analysis. This paper utilizes Ravid's proxy for a film's 
profitability in its analysis, calculated as total revenues/negative cost. It should 
be noted that this proxy is not a linear transformation of revenues. In fact, the 
profitability proxy and total revenues measures exhibit a relatively low correlation 
of r=.190. 
Finally, demographics of each movie were compiled from two sources: boxoffice-
mojo.com and movies.yahoo.com. Genre listings for each movie were compiled from 
these sources; all but one fell into the rough categories of comedy, drama, and action, 
with the one outlier being a horror film. MPAA ratings were similarly gathered to 
construct the dummy variable RATING, which takes a value of 1 if the film has a 
non-R rating. 31 Release year, opening weekend box office figures, and number of 
screens at widest release point were all gathered from www.boxofficemojo.com.Re-
lease date was received from the studios, and confirmed by www.boxofficemojo.com. 
The dummy variable HOLIDAY takes a value of 1 if the release date was within 3 
days of Summer, Thanksgiving, Christmas, President's Day, or Easter. 
Inspiration for measures of star power came from Ravid (1999). We use four 
alternative definitions for a star in our analysis. STARNOM is a dummy variable 
taking the value one if at least one above the line actor in the film has been previously 
nominated for an Academy Award. STARWIN is a dummy variable taking the value 
one if at least one above-the-line actor in the film has previously won an Academy 
Award. STARVALUAWARD is an ordinal variable constructed by summing the 
number of above-the-line actors in the film that have been previously nominated for 
an Academy Award and the number of above-the-line actors in the film that have 
previously won an Academy Award. STARNEXT is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if an above-the-line actor was an above-the-line actor in a top 20 annual 
domestic box office gross film. 
Inspiration for measures of awards came from Dodds (1988). We use three mea-
310nly 1 each of G and PG movies was in the sample. Exclusion of these two datapoints did not 
change the effect in analysis, so the RATING variable was constructed as it is. 
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Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
DOMREV 36730.53 33100.00 23498.17 88242.00 4916.00 
TOTREV 164247.50 142940.00 99577.32 369884.00 9832.00 
ROl DaM 51.00 0.66 238.77 1146.31 0.22 
ROl TOT 182.70 2.80 844.50 4056.10 0 .58 
NEGATIVE 56505.10 66000.00 44256.17 175327.00 61.30 
MARKETING 19830.61 16076.00 12508.46 46007.00 12508.46 
MKT STANDARD 2.43 0.41 8.73 42.40 0.13 
NUMWEEKS 78.39 79.00 28.35 145.00 36.00 
K 127.64 119.45 80.24 279.98 0.00 
OPENING 14760.74 13931.00 9216.70 39414.00 3022.00 
WIDEST RELEASE 2278.04 2515.00 645.45 2933.00 678.00 
Figure 5: Descriptive statistics of non-dummy variables. 
sures for award effect in our analysis. Major award categories are defined as Best 
Picture, Best Actor, and Best Actress Academy Awards. AWARDNOM is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the film was nominated in any of the major cate-
gories. AWARDWIN is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the film won any 
of the major categories. AWARDVALU is an ordinal variable that sums the num-
ber of major category nominations and wins the film has. Additional demographic 
data was compiled, including studio distributing the film and certain subject and 
content control variables, but size of dataset restricted ability to use these variables 
in analysis. 
In the data, two films in particular exhibit extremely high rates of profitability 
relative to the other films in the sample. Both films were independently produced 
with small budgets, distributed by a major distributor, and rated R. Neither film 
won any awards of note, nor did they have any known actors or director. The first, 
a comedy, exhibited an unusual distribution of revenues wherein more than 70% of 
its profits were derived from home video. The second, a horror, had roughly equal 
revenues from the three major markets of domestic box office, international box of-
fice, and home video. Because both of these movies had a profitability measures 
larger than the next largest by a factor of more than 10, these were examined care-
fully in analysis and treated both as suspected outliers and potentially informative 
datapoints in various stages. 
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Variable: (D In(TOTREV) (ij) ROI TOT (iii) In(TOTREV) _(iv) ROI TOT 
Two outliers Two outliers 
Total Revenues Profitability removed, with removed, with 
Regression Regression specification ~i) specification (ii) 
In(NEGATIVE) -0.182022 -483.8615*** 0.48574** -1.7238* 
[0.162] [102.951] [0.192] [0.996] 
In(MARKETING) 0.885364** 320.1839 0.429674 1.2568 
[0.340] [216.052] [0.267] [1.389] 
CONSTANT 5.039173 2064.224 2.2666 9.5704 
[2.260] [1436.833] [1.759] [9.136] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.304104 0.58888 0.6104 0.061645 
F-statistic 4.3699 16.7557 16.6685 1.656956 
Prob. 0.026634 0.0005 0.00008 0.218518 
N 23 23 21 21 
Figure 6: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of production and 
marketing costs on revenues and profitability. In column (i), the dependent variable 
is the log of total revenues. In column (ii) , the dependent variable is a proxy for 
profitability, namely Total Revenues/Negative Cost. Columns (iii) and (iv) re-run 
regressions (i) and (ii) with two extreme outliers removed. Standard errors are re-
ported in brackets. All variables are explained in Appendix A. *=sig. At.1 level, 
**=sig. At .05 level, ***=sig. At .01 level. . 
6 Results 
Figure 5 shows descriptive statistics about the major non-dummy variables used in 
our analysis. As is typical of the movie industry, the data shows a large degree of 
variance. The 23 films in our sample range in negative cost from about $61,000 up 
to $175 million. Total revenues in the sample range from $9 million to $369 million, 
and the proxy for profitability ranges from 0.58 to 4056.10. The large difference 
between the profitability proxy's mean and median is telling as to the highly skewed 
distribution of the profitability proxy, also evidenced by a kurtosis statistic of 21.03. 
The proxy for concavity ranged from films having cost curves approximating their 
average cost curve (K=O) to films with greater upfront expenditure, with a sample 
maximum of approximately 280. 
Ten of the films in the sample sport actors who had previously won an academy 
award (STARAWARD=l). Thirteen of the films feature actors who have been nomi-
nated for an Academy Award (STARNOM=l), and fourteen of the films have actors 
who have previously opened a top 20 annual domestic grossing film (STARNEXT=l). 
Four of the films in the sample were nominated for major Academy Awards (AWARD-
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NOM=l) and only one of the films in the sample won a major award (AWARD-
WIN=l). Ten of the films in the sample were classified as comedies, five as dramas, 
seven as actions, and one as horror. Nine of the films were rated R, twelve were 
PG13, and 1 each PG and G. Each of the films was distributed by one of five ma-
jor studios. Eleven of the films were released within three days of a holiday period 
(HOLIDAY=l). 
Figure 6 on the previous page shows the results of regressions of marketing and 
production costs on revenue and profitability. Regressions 1 and 2 were found to 
generally be problematic because of two large outliers skewing coefficient estimates. 
The scale of coefficients in regression 2 are quite large, in order to accommodate for 
two highly profitable films in the sample. When these two outliers were removed and 
regressions 1 and 2 were re-run with the data subset, the results were in line with 
expectations and are reported in columns 3 and 4. The revenue regression indicates 
that total revenues are significantly dependent on negative costs, and the coefficient 
is positive as expected. Though marketing is not shown to be statistically significant, 
its sign is in the right direction, in that increased marketing expenditure is expected 
to increase revenues. 
The profitability regression on the restricted sample is reported in Column 4, 
The results indicate the marginal significance of negative costs on profitability, and 
the coefficient implies that larger budget movies are on average less profitable than 
smaller budget films. The low goodness of fit statistics of regression 4 and the only 
marginal significance of negative costs on profitability, however, lead us to question 
the predictive power of the estimated equation. 
Figure 7 on the preceding page reports the results of including the concavity 
measure in the regression on profitability. Column 1 shows the results of estimation 
based on the full sample, and column 2 reports the results of the estimation with 
the two outliers removed. Both regressions corroborate Ravid(1999)'s results that, 
ceteris paribus, higher negative costs seem to be significantly related to lower rates 
of return. While the economic model presented earlier estimated that the coefficient 
on K should be negative, both regressions show insignificant, positive effects. In 
examining a scatterplot of rates of return and the proxy for concavity (Figure 5 in 
Appendix B), no pattern is immediately discernible. 
Figure 8 shows the effects of controlling for a holiday opening on the estimations 
of revenues and profitability. A plethora of evidence in the literature shows a positive 
effect of a holiday opening on total revenues stemming from the increased ability to 
tap into the lucrative teenager market when school is out. This effect is shown 
in column 1, where the HOLIDAY dummy shows a significant positive coefficient 
estimate. Successful estimation of profitability again eludes us, however. It seems 
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Variable: (1) ROI TOT (2) ROI TOT 
Profitability Regression 
Profitability with K, based on 
Regression with subsample with 2 
K outliers removed 
In(NEGATIVE) -490.7364*** -2.0084* 
[113.684] [1.045] 
In(MARKETING) 323.9061 1.4194 
[222.686] [1.405] 
K 0.27001 0.008986 
[1.659] [0.010] 
CONSTANT 5.039173 9.8069 
[1473.133] [9.175] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.62678 0.196255 
F-statistic 10.63563 1.383661 
Prob. 0.000252 0.281719 
N 23 21 
Figure 7: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of negative and mar-
keting costs and concavity on profitability. In both columns the dependent variable 
is a proxy for profitability, namely Total Revenues/Negative Cost. Column 2 re-runs 
regression 1 with two extreme outliers removed. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. All variables are explained in Appendix A. *=sig. at .1 level, **=sig. at 
.05 level, ***=sig. at .01 level. 
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Variable: (1) In(TOTREV) (2jROI TOT 
Profitability Regression 
Revenues with HOUDA Y, based on 
Regression with subsample with 2 
HOUDAY outliers removed 
In(NEGATIVE) -0.016171 -1.425889 
[0.174] [0.991] 
In(MARKETING) 0.511357 0.295587 
[0.511] [0.196] 
HOLIDAY 0.767163* 2.238879 
[0.391] [1.573] 
CONSTANT 0.767163 14.80223 
[2.254] [9.617] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.329984 0.112237 
F-statistic 4.611682 1.842845 
Prob. 0.013781 0.177688 
N 23 21 
Figure 8: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of negative and 
marketing costs and a holiday opening on revenues and profitability. In column 1 
the dependant variables is Total Revenues, and in column 2 the dependant variable 
is a proxy for profitability, namely Total Revenues/Negative Cost. Column 2 is run 
on the subset with two extreme outliers removed. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *=sig. at .1 level, **=sig. at .05 level, ***=sig. at .01 level. 
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Variable: (1) In(TOTREV) (2) ROI TOT 
Profitability Regression 
Revenues with Genre control 
Regression with dummies, based on 
Genre control subsample with 2 
dummies outliers removed 
In(NEGATIVE) 0.638376** -.830614 
[0.228] [1.234] 
In(MARKETING) 0.54192* 1.56014 
[0.268] [1.449] 
ACTION -.51989 -2.897471 
[0.420] [2.271] 
DRAMA -.847727* -3.4965 
[0.415] [2.248] 
CONSTANT -0.07838 -1.104438 
[2.070] [11.204] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.652248 0.091054 
F-statistic 10.37806 1.500876 
Prob. 0.000243 0.248787 
N 23 21 
Figure 9: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of negative and 
marketing costs and genre on revenues and profitability. In column 1 the dependant 
variables is Total Revenues, and in column 2 the dependant variable is a proxy for 
profitability, namely Total Revenues/Negative Cost. Column 2 is run on the subset 
with two extreme outliers removed. Standard Errors are reported in brackets. Genre 
dummy variables are relative to COMEDY. *=sig. at .1 level, **=sig. at .05 level, 
***=sig. at .01 level. 
that a holiday opening is not significantly related to profitability, indicating perhaps 
that theaters are able to take advantage of the increased demand (by studios) for 
scarce screen space by negotiating more advantageous contractual details, driving 
down profitability. 
Figure 9 shows the results of including genre control variables in the regressions. 
Again, negative cost and marketing seem to have a significant positive relationship 
with total revenues, but are not significantly related to return on investment. Column 
1 does, however, show that dramas on average have lower revenues than comedies, 
but this effect does not translate into higher profitability. Genre does not appear 
significant in profitability determination. 
Oscar nominations largely were not shown to be significantly related to revenues 
40 
Variable: (1) In(TOTREV) (2) In(TOTREV) (3J_lnlTOTREVl (4) In(TOTREV) 
Total Revenues Total Revenues Two outliers Two outliers 
Regression with Regression with removed, with removed, with 
STARNEXT STARNOM specification (1) specification [2) 
In (NEGATIVE) -0.248710 -0.176246 0.410711 ** 0.765379*** 
[0.169] [0.188] [0.183] [0.215] 
In(MARKETING) .904695** 0.883513** 0.451566* 0.291613 
[0.336] [0.350) [0.250) [0.292) 
STARNEXT 0.49446 ---- 0.530742* ----
[0.397) [0.278] 
STARNOM ---- 0.029928 ---- 0.726215** 
[0.458] [0.330] 
CONSTANT 5.2364 5.014652 2.498981 1.081648 
[2.235] [2 .349] [1.646) [1.685] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.254974 0.194407 0.660524 0.678964 
F-statistic 3.509723 2.769692 13.97145 15.0994 
Prob. 0.03534 0.069859 0.000076 0.000048 
N 23 23 21 21 
Figure 10: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of production and 
marketing costs and star presence on revenues. The dependent variable in all specifi-
cations is In (total revenues) Columns (3) and (4) re-run regressions (1) and (2) with 
two extreme outliers removed. Standard errors are reported in brackets. All vari-
ables are explained in Appendix A. *=sig. at .1 level, **=sig. at .05 level, ***=sig. 
at .01 level. 
or profitability. Similarly, Oscar wins were not telling. We do not , however, take 
these findings as conclusive evidence that Academy Awards are insignificant. Only 4 
films in the sample were nominated for Academy Awards, only one of which won, so 
even had a strong relationship been shown it would have been highly questionable. 
Rating effects were similarly not shown significant in any regressions. Again, much of 
this stems from data issues. The rating effect is typically associated with G and PG 
rated movies relative to R rated movies. Our sample, however , featured only 1 PG 
and 1 G rated movie, and the importance of a PG 13 rating in determining revenues 
or profitability relative to an R rating seems insignificant. The role of star power 
is probably the most long-standing discussion in the film industry literature. Initial 
regression results, reported in Figure 10 on page 40, indicate that all definitions of 
star presence have a significant, positive relationship with total revenues when the 
subset of the sample with two outliers removed are analyzed. Columns 3 and 4 show 
a strong positive star effect on revenues. As previously discussed, the star effect is 
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Variable: Cllln(TOTREVJ (2J In(TOTREV) (3) In(TOTREV) (4) In(TOTREV) 
Total Revenues Total Revenues Two outliers Two outliers 
Regression with Regress/on with removed, with removed, with 
STARNEXT STARNOM specification (1) specification (2 ) 
In(NEGATIVE) -0.248710 -0.176246 0.410711** 0.765379*** 
[0.169] [0.188] [0.183] [0.215] 
In(MARKETING) .904695** 0.883513** 0.451566* 0.291613 
[0.336] [0.350] [0.250] [0.292] 
STARN EXT 0.49446 ---- 0.530742* ----
[0.397] [0.278] 
STARNOM ---- 0.029928 ---- 0.726215** 
[0.458] [0.330] 
CONSTANT 5.2364 5.014652 2.498981 1.081648 
[2.235] [2.349] [1.646] [1.685] 
ADJUSTED R2 0.254974 0.194407 0.660524 0.678964 
F-statistic 3.509723 2.769692 13.97145 15.0994 
Prob. 0.03534 0.069859 0.000076 0.000048 
N 23 23 21 21 
Figure 11: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of production and 
marketing costs and star presence on profitability. The dependent variable in all 
specifications is a proxy for ROI, Total Revenues/Negative Cost. Standard errors 
are reported in brackets. All variables are explained in Appendix A. *=sig. at .1 
level, **=sig. at .05 level, ***=sig. at .01 level. 
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STARNEXT = 1 STARN EXT = 0 
(N = 14) eN = 9} 
MEAN SO MEAN SO t-value 
K 163.5628 73 .2348 71.7604 56.7561 3.186* 
ROI_TOT 3.8966 3.9339 460.8333 1348.4303 0.213 
TOTREV 185681.5 96279.11 130905.67 100748.174 0.205 
Figure 12: Univariate Tests for STARNEXT (films with an above-the-line actor who 
has opened a top 20 annual movie) and non-STARNEXT films. * = sig. at .01 level 
STARNOM = 1 STARNOM = 0 
eN = 13} (N = 10) 
MEAN SO MEAN SO t-value 
K 161.3247 68.4109 83.8502 75.7011 2.572* 
ROCTOT 2.0802 0.8788 417.5009 1278.6581 1.18 
TOTREV 164791.62 87092.974 163540.1 118843.067 0.029 
Figure 13: Univariate Tests for STARNOM (films with an above-the-line actor who 
has been previously nominated for an Academy Award) and non-STARNOM films. 
* = sig at .05 level 
more complex than it appears. To weight the two competing economic concepts of 
signaling and rent capture, we ran similar regressions on profitability. The results are 
reported in Figure 11 on the preceding page. It appears that while stars contribute 
to film rentals, they have a weakly significant negative contribution to profitability. 
This seems to imply that stars cost more than they're worth, signaling perhaps the 
degree to which leverage in negotiations have changed since the fall of the studio 
system. 
The final star hypothesis we wished to test was that posited by Albert (1998) 
that rather than simply increasing revenues or shifting profitability, inclusion of a star 
actually shifts the film to a different expected profitability distribution. To test this 
hypothesis, we performed univariate tests to compare both the means and variances 
of subsamples in the presence and absence of a star. Additionally, we reasoned that 
generally fixed up-front fees in films stem from stars demanding early payment. If 
this is the case, then it is possible that presence of a star could also change the 
distribution of cost curves in the sample, represented by K. Figures 12 and 13 on the 
previous page report the results of the univariate tests. 
While the univariate tests did not lend support to Albert (1998) 's theory, the 
test statistics created indicate that the means of the two subsamples are significantly 
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Dependent Variable: ROI_TOT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
C 2.660319 9.288259 0.286417 0.7788 
In(NEGATIVE) -0.954499 1.059194 -0.901156 0.3827 
HOLIDAY 1.326761 1.48577 0.892979 0.387 
In(MARKETING) 0.92804 1.364729 0.680018 0.5076 
K 0.032376 0.013322 2.430266 0.0291 
STARNOM 0.568733 2.989701 0.190231 0.8519 
K*STARNOM -0.033771 0.018109 -1.864871 0.0833 
\lI.dj. R-Squared 0.345237 
SE of regression 2.684242 
SSR 100.8721 
F-statistic 2.757571 
Probe F-statistic) 0.055265 
Figure 14: This table contains OLS regressions estimating effects of production and 
marketing costs, star presence, concavity, and interaction between concavity and star 
presence on profitability. 
different, implying that star presence is related to the degree of concavity in a film's 
cost curve as hypothesized. In an effort to unravel the star effects and effects of 
concavity on profitability, the earlier profitability regression was re-run with an in-
teraction term to measure the effect of concavity on profitability when in presence of 
a star relative to the effect when in absence. The final model of results are reported 
in Figure 14. 
The results indieate that higher concavity in the absence of a star is related to 
greater rates of return, but that the relative effect of higher concavity in the presence 
of a star is to decrease profitability. One explanation for this phenomenon is that 
there are conditions of asymmetric information in film production. If a star were to 
agree to participate in a movie that he knew would flop, his optimal strategy would 
be to demand a high fixed fee upfront. Similarly, a star that participates in a movie 
that she believes will be a resounding success should agree to take a percentage of 
the revenues and forego the fixed fee. James Cameron received only a percentage of 
revenues for his widely acclaimed and highly successful Titanic. Following similar 
reasoning, we could expect Ben Affieck and Jennifer Lopez to have requested large 
upfront fees for their recent bomb Gigli, though actual figures have not been released. 
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7 Discussion and Extensions 
The economic model developed in this paper is built upon three basic assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that there is a perfect (or near perfect) revelation of a film's 
commerciability during the production process. Second, it is assumed that when 
this quality is revealed, it is at least possible that the remaining costs to be incurred 
for completion are greater than the expected revenues (ie the time at which quality 
is known still allows for the possibility of halting a film's production). Thirdly, 
it is assumed that the film producers are profit maximizers. Violation of any of 
these assumptions could easily result in the unclearness of the relationship between 
concavity and film profitability evident in the data. 
Predicting the commercial success of a film based upon demographics has proven 
remarkably difficult. The vast majority of studies in the literature are able only to 
predict up to a third of variance based on film concept. 32 Shugan (2000) combines 
this basic concept analysis with analysis of intent-to-view surveys administered to 
respondents after they were given information about the film. This combined analysis 
is able to predict 63% of variability of revenues. It seems plausible that market 
research yields a fuzzy enough commerciability signal that it is not yet possible to 
truly make informed decisions to halt production. Additionally, most studies in the 
literature offering reasonable forecasts of revenue distribution are based upon data 
from either just before or just after a film's release. 33 Accurate forecasts might be 
useful at such a point in determining optimal advertising and distribution allocations, 
but would be useless in a marginal decision of whether to stop production of a movie. 
The possibility that the first two main assumptions of the model are not valid are 
based in the current academic literature. Academics studying the movie industry 
are typically looked upon by the studios as outsiders for one simple reason: the vast 
majority of their research is, by necessity, based upon public data. This is a huge 
limitation for film research conducted by "outsiders' 
rq , but does not imply that greater forecasting ability does not exist within the 
industry. In fact, the Motion Picture Association of America has been in existence 
for many years offering studio executives the opportunity to publish and read insider 
research under the strict conditions that no outsider has access (see Epstein 2005). 
Most journalists engaged in investigative reporting appear to describe the hidden 
culture inside Hollywood as one dominated by bottom-line ideologies driven by sta-
tistical modeling. Hayes (2004)'s description of his experience in the industry offers 
insight into the industry's nature: 
32See Moul (2005) 
33See Moul (2005), Shugan (2000) 
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We met the people behind Hollywood's sales culture - those who sell the 
films into the theaters, sell tickets at the box office, and massage the 
messages the studios want to sell to the public. It's a culture of pollsters 
and statisticians obsessed with screen counts, rental terms and fucking 
the competition.34 
It is difficult to conclude, then, that the limitations of market research detailed in 
current academic journals are necessarily binding to the agents making decisions in 
the industry. More research on the virtues and limits of market research in the film 
industry should be undertaken. 
The assumption that all participants act as profit maximizers is perhaps the most 
interesting. The production of a film requires a plethora of contributors for the fi-
nal project to be realized. Typically, those making the major production decisions 
(studio executives, producers, etc) are not the same people that are risking their 
money by investing in the film. The film industry is therefore rife with potential for 
managerial implications of principal-agent problems. Einav (2002) concludes that 
the likely reason for the overclustering of movies around a holiday period is that 
studio executives would rather accept the lower revenues stemming from overcompe-
tit ion than risk their job by opening on a non-holiday and bombing. Ravid (2003) 
similarly proffers agency issues as the reason for overproduction of R-rated movies, 
shown to be statistically dominated by G-rated movies. He explains that R-rated 
movies lose money less often, and their high rate of production stems from executive 
hedging. Problems of agency may arise with regard to our measure of concavity, 
with executives seeking to limit the risk to their job by following more traditional 
cost distributions. Additionally, the notion of halting production is taboo in the 
industry, so a studio executive could easily decide to go ahead with production on a 
film expected to generate a large loss rather than scrapping the project and risking 
future job ramifications. Further research into principal-agency issues in the film 
industry should be pursued. 
Aside from the possibility of the three assumptions discussed above being vi-
olated, our study suffered from data problems common to research into the film 
industry. Public data is fairly easy to come by, but analysis may be misleading. 
Instead, we opted to pursue internal data to get as accurate results as possible, and, 
in so doing, severely limited the size of the resulting data sample. Further analysis 
should be performed to corroborate the results of this paper to ensure that these are 
not merely the results of a skewed, small data set. 
34Hayes (2004), p. 14. 
46 
8 Conclusion 
Studio executives, academics, and starving would-be screenwriters all seek the elusive 
formula that will generate huge demand for a film at minimal cost. The general con-
sensus is that Hollywood houses an industry in which statistical modeling is useful, 
but the high degree of heterogeneity renders past performance as only mildly indica-
tive of future success. The academic literature seems to conclude that forecasting 
box office receipts based on ex ante characteristics is possible, but not precise. Key 
characteristics (budget size, marketing expenditure, star presence, etc) have been 
shown to be significantly related to higher revenues. The more pertinent question of 
forecasting profitability, however, has yet to be resolved. 
This paper sought to find yet another ex ante characteristic on which to aid the 
analysis of film profitability. Most of the literature's major findings were replicated 
in this paper's data, discrediting claims that the small dataset was not represen-
tative of the actual population. Only limited patterns could be discerned in the 
distribution of profitability, the most empirically significant of which was the pos-
sible presence of asymmetric information indicated by the significant interaction of 
cost curve concavity and star presence on the profitability proxy. 
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Append ,.x A 
7 OTREV Total Revenues from Domestic and International Box Office and 
all ancillary markets (in $thousands) 
INTREV International Box Office Revenue (in $thousands) 
HOMEREV Home Video Revenues (includes DVD and VHS sales and rentals, in $thousands) 
DOMREV Domestic Box Office Revenue (in $thousands) 
ROLTOT Proxy for Total ROI (TOTREV /NEGATIVE) 
NEGATIVE Total Negative Cost of the film (ie total cost incurred to produce the 
negatives of a film) (in $thousands) 
MARKETING Total Marketing Expenditure of the film (in $thousands) 
NUMWEEKS Number of Weeks from Greenlight to Release 
K Difference between area under actual cost curve and area under uniform cost curve 
DRAMA Genre Dummy Variable taking 1 if the movie was classified as a Drama, 0 if not 
ACTION Genre Dummy Variable taking 1 if the movie was classified as a Action, 0 if not 
COMEDY Genre Dummy Variable taking 1 if the movie was classified as a Comedy, 0 if not 
RATING Rating Dummy Variable taking 1 if the movie was rated G, PG, or PG13, 0 if 
movie was rated R 
STARAWARD Star Dummy Variable (1 if an actor or director in film has won an Oscar, 0 if not) 
STARNEXT Star Dummy Variable (1 if an above--the--line actor has opened a top 20 annual movie 
o if not) 
STARNOM Star Dummy Variable (1 if an actor or director in film has been nominated for an Oscar, 
o if not) 
STARVALUAWARD Star Ordinal Variable (Sum of Number of past nominated people in a movie and 
2*past award wins) 
AWARDWIN Award Dummy Variable (1 if movie won an Oscar in major cat., 0 if not) 
AWARDNOM Award Dummy Variable (1 if movie was nominated for an Oscar in major cat., 0 if not) 
AWARDVALU Award Ordinal Variable (Sum of Number of nominations and number of wins in major cat.) 
HOLIDAY Seasonality Dummy Variable taking 1 if opening weekend was around 
Thanksgiving, Christmas, President's Day, Easter, or Summer 
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